As we discussed in Part 2, MCM engaged FIGG to act as both Engineer of Record and to provide bridge design and engineering services for the project.īut in FIGG’s technical proposal to MCM, they stated that they, not an independent firm, would undertake the review.įast forward to a meeting on 30 June 2016, where the FDOT inform FIGG they can’t undertake the peer review – an independent peer review would be required by an external firm. On 14 January 2016 MCM were engaged in a design-build contract to deliver the bridge. In theory this is a robust system to ensure a design is error free, carried out by an independent firm whose expertise has been confirmed by the FDOT. The independent firm must be prequalified with the FDOT to undertake this work, and the cost of the review is borne by the design and construct firm.
These requirements demand that an independent firm – not the firm that designed the bridge – check that the bridge plans are compliant with the relevant design requirements. The Florida Department of Transport (FDOT) set out their peer review requirements in their Plans Preparation Manual.
These whys go on and on, and in this instalment we’ll answer a key one: why did gross errors in the bridge’s design go unidentified, despite the design being subject to peer review by an independent engineering firm.Ī close examination of why this peer review process failed shows how the systems we put in place to prevent engineering collapses can fall apart just as easily as the bridge itself. Why weren’t FIGG more concerned about the cracks? Why didn’t the Florida Department of Transport (FDOT) stop construction? Why did the parties believe re-tensioning Member 11 would return the bridge to a satisfactory condition? In fact many engineers involved in the project behaved this way. (You probably spent most of Part 2 shouting “stop, stop” while you read about the growing cracks.)īut engineers did behave this way. If this were a movie you’d say it was unrealistic, you’d say engineers would never behave so nonchalantly in the face of significant structural cracking. The more details you learn of what happened, the harder it is to understand why it happened. A curious paradox lies at the heart of trying to understand why the Miami bridge collapsed.
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